In February 2026, the Equality Law Clinic participated in a third-party intervention before the European Court of Human Rights in a case concerning the increasing use of so-called “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPPs). This intervention was developed in collaboration with leading international partners, including the Berkeley Center on Comparative Equality and Anti-Discrimination Law, the Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group (WISG), SAPARI, the Sulkhan-Saba Orbeliani University Legal Clinic, and the Centre for the Advancement of Equality, Gender and Inclusion Studies (AEGIS).
The case, XY v. Georgia (Application No. 16777/23) (the applicant’s name has been anonymized to prevent any retaliation), was drafted in the context of defamation proceedings brought by alleged perpetrators of sexist and sexual violence. It concerns a civil servant who, after enduring repeated sexual harassment by her hierarchical superior over several years, resigned and later spoke publicly about her experience through a series of television interviews—initially anonymously, and subsequently in a non-anonymous capacity. Following these disclosures, her former superior initiated defamation proceedings against her and was successful before the domestic courts, which ordered her to publicly retract her statements under penalty of a fine on the grounds that certain aspects of her allegations were deemed factually inaccurate.
Against this background, the legal clinic’s intervention sought to bring a distinct and novel perspective to the Court’s analysis. While the case raises important questions under Article 10 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to freedom of expression, and has traditionally been approached through that lens (see, for instance, Allée v. France), or, in some instances, under Article 8, which protects the right to respect for private life (as in C. v. Romania), the clinic argued that these frameworks alone do not fully capture the structural implications of such proceedings. In particular, the intervention emphasised that SLAPP-type defamation actions, when deployed in response to disclosures of sexist and sexual violence, may produce a disproportionate chilling effect on women’s speech. Building on this observation, the clinic advanced the argument that such cases should also be examined under Article 14 of the Convention, which prohibits discrimination, in conjunction with Article 10.
This approach highlights the gendered dimension of freedom of expression in contexts where individuals speaking out about violence are exposed to retaliatory litigation. By foregrounding this argument, the clinic aimed to demonstrate that these disputes extend beyond individual reputational conflicts and instead reflect broader patterns of inequality affecting women’s ability to participate in public discourse.
To date, the Court has not recognised a violation based on the combined application of Articles 10 and 14 in this context. Acknowledging such a violation would mark a significant development in the Court’s jurisprudence, by affirming that the protection of freedom of expression must be understood in light of the conditions necessary for its effective and equal exercise, particularly where structural inequalities risk undermining access to public discourse.
The text in French is here
